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Most of those who take macro and monetary policy decisions are
agents. The worst penalty which can be applied to these agents is
to sack them if they are perceived to have failed. To be publicly
sacked as a failure is painful, often severely so, but the pain is finite.
Agents thus have loss functions which are bounded above, in contrast
to the unbounded quadratic loss functions which are usually assumed
for policy analysis. We find a convenient mathematical form for such
a loss function, which we call a bell loss function. We contrast the
diﬀerent behaviour of agents with quadratic and bell loss functions in
three settings. Firstly we consider an agent seeking to reach multiple
targets subject to linear constraints. Secondly we analyse a simple
dynamic model of inflation with additive uncertainty. In both these
settings certainty equivalence holds for the quadratic, but not the bell
loss function. Thirdly we consider a very simple model with one target
and multiplicative (Brainard) uncertainty. Here certainty equivalence
breaks down for both loss functions. Policy is more conservative than
in the absence of multiplicative uncertainty, but less so with the bell
than the quadratic loss function.
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1 Introduction
Most of those who take macro and monetary policy decisions are agents,
not themselves principals. The government is an agent of the electorate; the
Central Bank is an agent of the government, and through them of the public
more widely. By the same token many, perhaps most, financial decisions are
similarly taken by agents. Bank and fund managers are agents of those that
have committed funds to them.
The thesis of this paper is that insuﬃcient attention has been given to
this fact in analysing the likely behaviour of such decision-making agents, in
particular to the implications for the shape of such an agent’s loss function.
What is the worst penalty, or sanction, that principals can normally apply
to their agent? The standard answer is to sack them, if they are perceived
to have failed. It is feasible to think of applying more severe penalties, as
the scale of failure rises, but this leads to greater diﬃculties in attracting
high-quality people to act as agents. Be that as it may, we shall assume
that in the present state of aﬀairs the main sanction for failure is dismissal.
To be (publicly) sacked as a failure is painful, often severely so, especially
for agents with previously established reputations, but the pain is finite. As
the likelihood of being sacked approaches unity, with the outcomes deviating
increasingly from the objective agreed with the principal, so the loss function
will become asymptotically equal to this finite loss.
This contrasts sharply with the implications of the standard quadratic
loss function, where the loss increases towards infinity as the outcome diﬀers
from that desired. This has some natural justification in certain physical
cases (e.g. heat, fluid intake) where deviation from the optimum (in either
direction) at some point leads to death. Being removed from oﬃce is only
rarely perceived as being on the same plane!
Indeed the main justification usually given for employing a quadratic loss
function, apart from the fact that everyone else does so, is that it is mathe-
matical tractable, and also that, within limits, it may be a reasonably robust
model of reality, (Chadha and Schellekens 1999; for some recent variants, see
Schellekens, 2002 and al-Nowaihi and Stracca, 2001; for a more generalised
critique of quadratic loss functions on behavioural grounds, see Kahneman
and Tversky, 2000). Our purpose here is to suggest an alternative, and more
realistic, loss function for an agent, which has a reasonably simple mathe-
matical formulation, and to examine how agents’ behaviour, with such a loss
function, will diﬀer from that of someone (e.g. a principal) with a quadratic
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loss function.
Principals will (should) normally be able to specify relatively clearly to
their agents what their objectives may be, though even here a multiplicity
of objectives and horizons may complicate matters. But in a world of uncer-
tainty the ‘best’ results in any time period may occur because the agent is
luckier, less risk-averse, cuts legal corners, or for a variety of other reasons
not directly connected with either ‘eﬀort’ or ability. So how do principals
decide when to abandon (sack) their initial choice of agent, and move their
custom (e.g. money or vote) to another, especially given that frictions (e.g.
information linkages; ‘the devil you know is better than the devil that you
do not know’) cause any such moves to be expensive to the principal?
The standard answer is to apply some form of ‘bench-marking’. (See for
example Basak, Shapiro and Teplá, 2002; Basak, Pavlova and Shapiro, 2002;
Jorion, 2000; Teplá, 2001; Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok, 1999; Chevalier
and Ellison, 1997; Fung and Hsieh, 1997, Grossman and Zhou, 1996). That
is the principal compares the results obtained by the agent either to some
absolute, or to some relative, measure of achievement. So long as the agent
remains on the right side of the benchmark, she is regarded as ‘successful’,
and would as a generality expect to be continued in position as agent. Indeed,
an agent who was summarily sacked without proper cause while still being
on the right side of the agreed benchmark would often be able to sue for
unfair dismissal. In contrast the agent that failed to meet the pre-arranged
benchmark by a large margin might not only be sacked, but even face a legal
suit for negligence; the case in the UK in 2001 of Unilever against Mercury
Asset Management was in point. In the monetary field, the establishment
of publicly-announced ranges for the maintenance of inflation is another ex-
ample; the requirement for the UK’s Monetary Policy Committee to write
a letter to the Chancellor when inflation diverges by more than 1% from its
current objective is again a case.
Such benchmarks are inherently somewhat arbitrary. Why, for example,
was the trigger for the Monetary Policy Committee to write a letter set at
1%, rather than say 11
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%? Historical experience of (absolute and relative)
deviations from the (optimal) target is likely to play a large role, and bench-
marks may well be adjusted in the light of such developing experience. But
even when such benchmarks have been set, it is usually well understood that
they may be broken for reasons that are no ‘fault’ of the agent. In the case
of monetary policya
